The Wall Street Journal - July 22

Outgunning India's Maoists Isn't Enough

But neither is more development aid on its own. Delhi needs to adopt both approaches together.

By VIKAS KUMAR

After Maoist insurgents, or Naxalites, killed about 100 policemen and 180 civilians over the last few weeks, India is overflowing with counterinsurgency proposals ranging from police reforms to development schemes for the Naxal-affected areas. History suggests those plans might work, to an extent, over the short term. But a long-term solution is set to remain elusive.

Since independence, other parts of the country have developed at the expense of these areas, which contain almost the entire mineral wealth of India and a large share of other natural resources. Mining and hydropower projects have displaced millions, who have lost their habitat, livelihoods and cultural identity. The state has failed to reconcile the conflicting interests of the people in these areas, whose constitutional rights to things like adequate means of livelihood have been systematically violated, and the growing urban middle class elsewhere. This failure lies at the root of the insurgency, which the extreme left is trying to recast as a war against democracy and free markets.

Among the suggestions to tackle the problem, police reforms are the most unobjectionable. Everyone agrees we need a better equipped and more humane police force. But concerns regarding whether Delhi can effect such changes at the local level under India's federalist system have stalled progress in this regard. Chief ministers of some Naxal-affected provinces are not even accepting a unified command to integrate the operations of central and provincial police forces.

The issue of development is more contentious. On one extreme are those who want the harnessing of natural resources to go on as before as the opposite would slow down economic growth and adversely affect the pursuit of development goals. Those on the other extreme demand an immediate moratorium on all capital-intensive economic activities, and greater environmental restoration in Naxal-affected areas. They want the state to preserve the remaining Gardens of Eden, something the locals are presumed to want. They also presume that locals prefer a handicraft- and nature-tourism-based economy and that the state can develop infrastructure for the tourism industry in these areas without the participation of the private sector.

The extremism of the two sides is compounded by their naïveté. They expect the state to provide schools, hospitals and other civic amenities in the Naxal-affected areas. But the lack of development in these areas is being discussed precisely because, in the last two months, the state has been violently ousted from a few densely forested districts. Will the heavily armed Naxals, who thrive on lack of development, allow state-led development in and around their strongholds? It is naïve to assume that ordinary people in these areas can freely choose between the state and the Naxals without fear of intimidation.

For their part, the Naxals blame capitalists for people's plight but exclusively target police, schools and public transport. The Naxals are, in fact, running a hugely profitable extortion business, with estimated annual revenue between $300 million and $500 million. Similarly, they blame capitalists for destruction of forests but are themselves involved in massive smuggling of forest products. Will the Naxal leadership abandon their business empire just because the state agrees to open naturopathic hospitals and vernacular schools, in which children will be taught how to weave eco-friendly baskets out of natural fibers?

So, what is the solution? The Naxals are not open to talks and also will not allow direct dialogue with people in their strongholds. In the past they have used the pauses in fighting during talks to regroup. Unfortunately, nothing other than force appears likely to alter the ground situation in their impregnable strongholds, which constitute about 1% of India's area but enable them to operate in as much as 25% of India. Defeating the Naxals is not all that difficult but the collateral damage could alienate local people.

The state has, therefore, decided against using the army or launching an all-out police assault on Naxal strongholds. It is instead going to launch a massive development plan and improve local governance and involve the civil society in implementing its "new" policy. Most of these policy measures have been on the agenda of the ruling Congress party since 2004, when it returned to power after a decade. The state is also trying to selectively neutralize the Naxal leadership, largely middle-class and Telugu-speaking. Without that leadership the insurgency spread across varied language and climatic zones is likely to split into a number of smaller "problems."

But there is no guarantee that the central government in Delhi will manage to conclusively resolve these smaller problems. One challenge today is that insurgencies help provincial governments to extract aid and other concessions from the center. Moreover, some political parties depend on Naxal support in elections. So local officials face mixed incentives in dealing with the insurgency and may be less than enthusiastic about fixing it for good. Compounding matters, the Congress party that heads the coalition government in New Delhi is in power in just one of the six most affected provinces..

This raises the prospect of a worrying scenario: A decapitated Naxalite movement splinters into smaller, highly localized groups that degenerate into ideologically neutral, parochial criminalism. While not specifically targeting the state themselves, they could create safe havens for future insurgencies. In the 1970s, the state managed to stamp out Naxalism through half-hearted land reforms and police repression. But the subsequent apathy toward the core economic complaints regarding ownership of land and its resources in the region ultimately rejuvenated the insurgency. Even though the state will once again manage to out-spend and out-gun the insurgents, there's a real danger that history will repeat itself.

Mr. Kumar is an independent researcher based in Bangalore.

Source : http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703467304575382542351115362.html#printMode