The Futility of Partitioning of Afghanistan

Partition is in the air, it seems. Just as the ICJ was contemplating the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia, along came the detailed proposal for de facto partition of Afghanistanfrom Ambassador Robert Blackwill. Walter referenced the article in aprevious post, and if you didn’t go and read it in its entirety the other day, you ought to click on over now and give it a once-over.

Astute readers will note that we’ve finally reached that point in the Afghanistan war—the point that was reached much earlier in Iraq. It was in 2004 that Ambassador Peter Galbraith fired a similar salvo in the ongoing debate on what to do with our ward state in the Middle East. And much like with the Galbraith plan, there’s a whiff of unreality to what Ambassador Blackwill is proposing.

It’s not that his argument blithely dismisses the human costs of what partition usually entails, as Ahmed Rashid suggested in the second half of an op-ed in this morning’s Financial Times. After all, Blackwill was U.S. Ambassador to India—a fractious land that is no stranger to sectarian strife both along its border and within. And in this capacity he was no doubt made very aware of the kind of repercussions partition produces. Indeed, Blackwill is explicit in excusing the inevitable human toll by appealing to a lack of vital U.S. national interests at stake in Afghanistan. Of course he’s right to do so, as this kind of incredibly costly war cannot be run indefinitely for purely humanitarian ends.

And it’s not that partition is always categorically the worst outcome in any situation, as some reflexively note as soon as the p-word is uttered. Despite the grisly costs in lives lost and ruined, partition was arguably the only way forward for India and Pakistan in the wake of Great Britain’s hasty departure from the subcontinent. Though countless thousands died, it’s easy to imagine many more perishing in an ensuing civil war had orderly partition not occurred, slapdash as it was. And the partition of Yugoslavia along the borders of its constituent ethnic republics, though bloody and painful, has led to an era of relative peace and reconciliation in the region. Even Bosnia’s de facto partition into autonomous ethnic para-states, though it bodes ill for its future integrity, has brought a certain level of stability to that patchwork nation.

No, the unreality kicks in towards the end of the article, where Ambassador Blackwill lists the supposedly surmountable challenges his plan faces. The following three passages stick out like sore thumbs:

Pakistan would likely oppose de facto partition. Managing Islamabad’s reaction would be no easy task — not least because the Pakistan military expects a strategic gain once the U.S. military withdraws from Afghanistan. …

… Fearing a return of Pakistan dominance in Afghanistan, India would likely encourage Washington to continue ground combat in the south for many years to come — and would have to be told that was not in the cards. …

… Putting together a coalition of like-minded nations to implement this strategy would be a daunting diplomatic challenge — not least with Tehran.

So the three nearby major powers with most at stake in Afghanistan do not want Afghanistan partitioned. And going by the first half of Ahmed Rashid’s op-ed, it would appear that there’s absolutely zero constituency among the Afghans themselves for such a solution. The idea is a non-starter, pure and simple. It’s not that American power is in decline. It’s that it’s difficult to imagine any Great Power ever being able to fundamentally reshape a local reality against the wishes of all of the regional players.

But it’s hard to blame Ambassador Blackwill for his mistake. The core assumption at the heart of his proposal—that we can shape the outcome in any meaningful way if only we use our power correctly—is the same core assumption you’ll find in almost all plans for Afghanistan. Rory Stewart’scaustic critique of these assumptions in Der Spiegel, now just over a month old, is more and more devastating with each passing day. Perhaps it’s something indelibly Western in our mindsets that forces us to see the world as a giant puzzle, with all its problems ultimately solvable. The danger is that this fallacy may lead us to reliably pick the wrong courses of action. Over and over and over again.

Source : http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2010/08/04/on-the-futility-of-partition/